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Executive Summary
Executive Summary
The Government of Uzbekistan operates a system 
of forced labour which has been estimated to 
coerce approximately one million people annually 
into participating in the cotton harvest. Following 
courageous reporting, activism, and whistleblowing, 
the Uzbek government has committed at the 
highest levels to eradicating forced and child labour 
from the cotton sector. 
One of the two crucial annual reports that both measures 
incidences of forced and child labour in the cotton sector, 
and attempts to diagnose strengths and weaknesses in 
Uzbekistan’s reform effort, is produced by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) through its third party monitoring unit 
stationed in Tashkent. Established through a Multi-Donor Trust 
Fund by the World Bank, with support from the European Union, 
the United States and Switzerland, the unit has produced three 
annual monitoring reports since 2015. 
Following serious criticism of the third party monitoring 
methodology, ethicality and accuracy by civil society, the 
first author of this evaluation was invited by the ILO’s Chief 
Technical Adviser to review the 2017 cotton harvest report. To 
conduct the review, benchmarks drawn from the international 
methodological literature and the ILO’s own monitoring manual 
were employed. Once applied serious breaches were identified. 
A series of questions prompted by the review’s initial findings 
was sent to the ILO’s third party monitoring unit for clarification. 
No response has been received.  
Among the greatest concerns raised during the review was 
a lack of explicit reference in the 2017 harvest report to the 
vulnerability of participants who may be victims of state-
organised labour, the special sensitivities this prompts for 
research, or the complexities associated with conducting 
accurate fieldwork in a deeply authoritarian country where 
surveillance, arbitrary detention, torture, and repression are 
lived realities for citizens. Key shortcomings observed during 
the evaluation include: 
1. The failure to obtain informed consent from vulnerable 
participants; 
2. A high risk that cotton pickers did not freely participate in 
interviews; 
3. The confidentiality of interviews and the anonymity of 
participants were not adequately secured; 
4. Vulnerable participants’ wellbeing was compromised, 
including being exposed to the risk of retaliation; 
5. Data-collection was conducted under conditions that raise 
serious concerns over its  accuracy;
6. Serious flaws were uncovered in the research design, 
methodology, and analysis, which potentially impacted on 
data-sets and associated factual assessments; 
7. Clearly inconsistent and inaccurate information appeared in 
the 2017 harvest report suggesting weaknesses in quality 
control; and   
8. There was a failure to ensure the third party monitoring 
team operated at arms-length from government in a 
way that would secure the report’s real, and perceived, 
independence.  
These flaws are of such a substantive and significant nature that 
they seriously undermine the credibility, accuracy, and ethicality 
of the ILO’s 2017 harvest report. To remedy these errors, flaws 
and inaccuracies the following recommendations are made:
1. The ILO third party monitoring team should consider an 
alternative method to phone polls when attempting to 
estimate national incidences of forced labour to ensure the 
data is accurate, representative, and collected in a way that 
protects the rights of vulnerable participants. A triangulated 
approach needs to be used that draws on investigative 
methods and cotton picker testimony, freely secured through 
informed consent in a confidential, safe environment.
2. Preparation for, and execution of, field interviews with 
cotton pickers must give much greater attention to free 
participation, informed consent, anonymity, confidentiality, and 
special protocols for children. This requires greater levels of 
independence from government than is currently exhibited. 
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3. The third party monitoring team should cease practices 
that could expose participants’ personal data. This includes 
recording personal information on insecure mediums and 
employing insecure modes of communication.  
4. Anonymised data-sets should be published in full on the 
ILO website, and greater use should be made of analysed 
primary data in the report, to ensure full transparency.  
5. When drafting the annual harvest report a transparent 
system of peer review should be used that draws on local 
and international expertise in the areas of forced labour and 
human rights, to strengthen rigour with respect to data-
analysis and critical reflection. 
6. It is essential that robust steps are taken to ensure the third 
party monitoring unit operates at arms-length from the state, 
and does not engage in any practice that would lead the 
public to question their objectivity, independence, or capacity 
to report on monitoring findings in an unadulterated fashion. 
This would include clearly differentiating between the unit 
responsible for monitoring incidences of forced labour and 
those responsible for building capacity in government and 
civil society.
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1. Introduction
Introduction
State organised regimes of forced labour, especially 
in the cotton sector, are among the most pressing 
human rights challenges confronting Uzbekistan. 
Around three million people are mobilised annually 
to harvest cotton (Andrees 2017; ILO 2017a). It is 
approximated that a third of this labour force has 
been recruited through a range of coercive practices 
primarily organised by state institutions, with public 
sector employees being seriously impacted (Human 
Rights Watch/Uzbek-German Forum for Human 
Rights 2017; ILO 2017a; Uzbek-German Forum for 
Human Rights 2016).
Owing to the courage and commitment of victims, activists, 
independent monitors, journalists, advocates, and whistle-
blowers, often at great personal risk, a global spotlight has been 
placed on forced labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton sector. Intense 
international advocacy from civil society, the private sector and 
public agencies, has prompted welcomed policy change at 
the highest levels within the Uzbek state. The Government of 
Uzbekistan has explicitly agreed to eradicate child and forced 
labour in the cotton sector. 
Against this backdrop, in 2014 the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) signed an agreement with the World Bank, to 
undertake third party monitoring of forced and child labour in the 
cotton sector. This followed allegations that World Bank funding 
was facilitating projects linked to these illegal practices. 
Third party monitoring involves a number of core activities (ILO 
2018a: 9). They include:
1. Raising awareness of labour standards and rights in 
Uzbekistan.
2. Building government and civil society capacity to eradicate 
forced and child labour.
3. Assisting with the development and evaluation of the 
effectiveness of feedback mechanisms for reporting on 
incidences of forced labour and other abusive practices.
4. Monitoring incidences of child and forced labour in the 
cotton sector. 
This activity is financially supported through a Multi-Donor Trust 
Fund established by the World Bank, with support from the 
European Union, the United States and Switzerland (ILO 2018a). 
Third party monitoring in Uzbekistan is administered through 
a special unit, based in Tashkent. The unit is led by its Chief 
Technical Adviser, Jonas Astrup, and Technical Officer, Oxana 
Lipcanu. 
The ILO third party monitoring team has published detailed 
reports on the 2015, 2016 and 2017 harvests. While there is 
a thematic focus on monitoring child and forced labour in 
regions impacted by World Bank funded projects, third party 
monitoring has evolved into a national benchmarking exercise 
that measures incidences of forced and child labour both within 
World Bank project areas and beyond.   
The annual third party monitoring report published by the ILO 
has a significant global impact on stakeholder perceptions 
and understandings of forced labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton 
sector. Alongside the annual monitoring report produced 
by independent NGO, the Uzbek-German Forum for Human 
Rights, the ILO’s findings are among one of the most cited 
sources for gauging progress in eradicating forced and child 
labour in Uzbekistan’s cotton sector (see, for example, UNICEF 
2016; United States Department of Labour 2016; United States 
Department of State 2018).  
Serious concerns, however, have been raised over the 
methodology and ethical procedures employed by the ILO when 
conducting third party monitoring (see Uzbek-German Forum 
for Human Rights 2018). In light of these concerns, the ILO’s 
Chief Technical Advisor invited Professor Lasslett to review the 
monitoring methodology and ethical procedure at a meeting 
convened by the Cotton Campaign in Washington DC on 19 
March 2018. 
To conduct the review, the authors (Lasslett and Gstrein) 
distilled benchmark standards for rigour and ethics from the 
methodological literature on research with victims of forced 
labour and cognate areas such as human trafficking. These 
standards are set out in section two. Complementing these 
benchmarks drawn from the international methodological 
literature is the ILO’s own Monitoring Manual, published as 
Annex 1 to its 2015 harvest report.  Produced by the ILO’s 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work Branch, it establishes 
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principles for monitoring that are designed to underpin rigour 
and credibility. 
Both benchmarks were used to assess the ILO’s report on the 
2017 harvest, which was published online on 1 February 2018. 
Following a preliminary review, a series of questions were sent 
to Jonas Astrup (ILO Chief Technical Adviser - Uzbekistan), 
Oxana Lipcanu (ILO Technical Officer – Uzbekistan), Beate 
Andrees (ILO Chief, Fundamental Principles and Rights Branch 
- Geneva) and Kari Tapiola (Special Advisor to the Director 
General of the ILO’s International Labour Bureau - Geneva), on 
19 June 2018, seeking clarification in a range of areas where 
concern had been raised. A reminder was sent on 17 July 2018. 
No response has been forthcoming.   
Among the greatest concerns raised during the review was 
the lack of explicit reference in the 2017 harvest report to 
the vulnerability of participants who may be victims of state-
organised labour, the special sensitivities this prompts for 
research, or the complexities associated with conducting 
fieldwork in a deeply authoritarian country where surveillance, 
arbitrary detention, torture, and repression are lived realities for 
all citizens (see, for example, Amnesty International 2015; Human 
Rights Watch 2011 & 2014; International Commission of Jurists 
2013; Lasslett et al 2017). In particular, the evaluation points to 
the following issues: 
1. The failure to obtain informed consent from vulnerable 
participants; 
2. A high risk that cotton pickers did not freely participate in 
interviews; 
3. The confidentiality of interviews and the anonymity of 
participants were not adequately secured; 
4. Vulnerable participants’ wellbeing was compromised, 
including being exposed to the risk of retaliation; 
5. Data-collection was conducted under conditions that raise 
serious concerns over its  accuracy;
6. Serious flaws were uncovered in the research design, 
methodology, and analysis, which potentially impacted on 
data-sets and associated factual assessments; 
7. Clearly inconsistent and inaccurate information appeared in 
the 2017 harvest report suggesting weaknesses in quality 
control; and   
8. There was a failure to ensure the third party monitoring 
team operated at arms-length from government in a 
way that would secure the report’s real, and perceived, 
independence.  
To assist remedy these serious shortcomings, a series of 
practical recommendations have been made which are 
summarised in the evaluation’s final section.    
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2. International and ILO Guiding Principles  
International and ILO Guiding Principles  
This section sets out benchmark standards distilled from the methodological literature on research with 
vulnerable participants, including victims of forced labour and human trafficking. These benchmarks are 
outlined in section 2.1. In section 2.2 an abridged version of the ILO’s own principles for monitoring are 
presented. 
2.1. Best practice guidelines for conducting research with victims of forced labour 
1. Methodology and methods
1.1 Appropriate methodology •	 Information collection and documentation must be done in a way that is methodologically sound 
and meets the standards of the discipline and professional practice
•	 Consideration must be given to the vulnerability of participants in the development of 
methodological approaches e.g. the use of focus groups may not be appropriate for the sharing 
of sensitive information
1.2 Interviewers and translators •	 Interviewers and translators (if used) must be carefully selected and appropriate to the context, 
including consideration of any gender or religious sensitivities
•	 Staff must have been trained in interviewing techniques and have appropriate  
communication skills
•	 Risks to research staff in the course of undertaking the research must be considered and acted 
upon, including having a security plan
•	 Consideration should be given to the needs of support staff who may be exposed to potentially 
traumatic information from participants
1.3 Safe and appropriate space •	 Interview spaces should be both secure and private
•	 Participants should feel safe and not intimidated by the location for interviews
1.4 Management of data •	 Data must be kept in a secure manner and in keeping with the requirements for anonymity, de-
linked from participants
•	 Particular consideration should be given to the risks associated with the digital collection of 
data, including privacy and security 
2. Ethical considerations
2.1 Informed consent •	 The process of obtaining informed consent is ongoing and continues beyond the initial  
giving of consent
•	 Participants should be made aware of the purpose of the research, methods used, the  
intended use of the data and expected outcomes
•	 Researchers should explore with participants any potential risks and benefits 
•	 Participation must be fully voluntary and participants should have the right to withdraw  
at any time
•	 Obtaining oral consent may be more appropriate than written consent
•	 Consent must be given for the use of devices to record or store information
•	 The obtaining of informed consent should not be devolved to ‘gatekeepers’
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Table 2.1 Guiding Principles: These principles are drawn from Brunner 2018; Connolly 2003; ILO 2012; Jacobsen and Landau 2003; 
Lewis 2016; McKenzie, McDowell and Pittaway 2007; Pittaway, Bartolomei, and Hugman 2010; Refugee Studies Centre n.d.; Scott and 
Geddes 2016; Taylor and Latonero 2018; WHO 2003; WHO 2007.
2.2 Anonymity and confiden-
tiality
•	 Participants’ identities and confidentiality must be protected and the means by which this will 
occur should be discussed as part of the consent process
•	 Any limitations to the issue of confidentiality must be raised with participants
2.3 Compensation for partici-
pation
•	 The provision of a fee for participation must be given careful consideration
•	 Compensation for time, travel and lost earnings can be recognised but must be balanced 
against creating a sense of obligation or indebtedness on the part of the participant
2.4 Well-being of participants •	 The principle to ‘do no harm’ should guide the actions of the researcher
•	 Assess the risks associated with the participant’s engagement in the research – including an 
assessment at the outset as to whether an interview should proceed 
•	 The safety of participants is paramount
•	 Do not retraumatise: questions should be carefully formulated to avoid provoking emotionally 
charged responses
•	 Ensure referral services are available locally for anyone disclosing information that may cause 
them trauma or have caused them trauma in the past
•	 Serious harm protocols must be in place in the event of a disclosure relating to immediate and 
serious harm by a participant
2.5 Working with children •	 In addition to the items above, consideration should be given to the particular  
vulnerabilities of children
•	 Interview or survey instruments may need to be modified to ensure appropriate  
language is used
•	 Researchers should be aware of any child protection issues 
2.6 Relationship with sponsors, 
funders, host governments
•	 Roles, rights and obligations of all stakeholders should be clarified at the outset of the research 
and potential conflicts of interest should be identified and explored
•	 Participants should be assured of researchers’ independence from authorities 
•	 Researchers should seek assurance that access to participants is not conditional on any 
requirement to compromise professional or scholarly standards
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2.2. ILO principles for monitoring  
A Monitoring Manual was published in Annex 1 of the ILO’s 2015 monitoring report. It was produced by the 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work Branch of the ILO. Below is an abridged version of the Principles 
for Monitoring set out in the manual. A full version of the principles are available from ILO 2015 (available 
here).
Principles
3. Credibility •	 The information collected through the effort has to be trustworthy and cover the real/factual 
situation; only in this way can progress be made to improve the situation. This is achieved 
by working with qualified and trained staff with understanding of child and forced labour and 
monitoring techniques. Any visits to cotton fields, educational and medical facilities and other 
interviews need to be random and unannounced surprise visits. 
4. Transparency •	 The methodology and process of monitoring, including the tools used and the content of this 
manual are shared with all necessary stakeholders. Similarly, the information produced through 
it is public information (once processed and made anonymous to protect confidentiality).
5. Neutrality •	 The monitoring effort is done in the spirit of neutrality with the absence of bias. Monitoring is 
not set to prove right or wrong any preconception or previous finding or allegation of the use 
of forced and / or child labour in the cotton harvest of Uzbekistan, but to find out the true state 
of affairs in relation to the realization of the fundamental labour rights of children and adults as 
prescribed by national legislation and ILO Conventions.
6. Reliability •	 The monitoring effort has to produce information worthy of reliance and trust. The data 
collected through the effort will not leave room for interpretation and will be purely factual. 
Monitors must not try to influence the responses of interviewees and must record accurately 
the responses given to them. In order to achieve reliability, a variety of research methods 
are applied, including direct observations, key informant interviews, survey questionnaires, 
photography and reviewing administrative records. ... Monitors will be triangulating information 
received from several sources in order to improve reliability.
7. Validity •	 Cotton fields/farms, educational and medical facilities and other sites are randomly sampled 
for visits ... Interviews are to be held in private and without the presence of employer or 
intermediaries (apart from interpreters). Interviewing needs an approach that allows those 
interviewed to speak freely and without fear.
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Table 2.2 ILO Principles: Extracts taken from ILO 2015.
8. Ethical •	 The monitoring effort has to be in accordance with the ILO standards for right conduct and 
practice in monitoring child and forced labour. Special planning, consideration and arrangement 
is needed by monitors to organize a conducive monitoring environment. It must be ensured that 
information revealed by respondents does not lead to reprisals for them or their family. In order 
to ensure that the monitoring does not result in harm for anyone involved, no punitive measures 
shall be taken against monitors, respondents and their families. If such cases are heard of, they 
will be registered and reported. ... The information gathered during interviews will be recorded 
without the names and identities of the respondents, and information will be recorded without 
revealing identities (even the location may be hidden in the database where necessary to 
protect an individual’s identity). Respondents are guaranteed to be free from repercussions 
for collaborating with monitors in terms of providing information. Repeat visits may be made 
to certain locations to check whether reprisals have been taken since the first monitoring visit. 
Monitors must not share monitoring information or their opinions with anyone outside their 
monitoring unit or the ILO Chief Technical Adviser (if necessary, via the ILO field monitor), either 
during or after TPM. 
9. Best Interest of the Child •	 All adults involved in the monitoring have to do what is best for children. The best interests of 
children must be the primary concern in making decisions that may affect children.
10. Get it Done at the Local 
Level
•	 When monitoring teams do find incidences or likely incidences of forced labour, or receive 
information suggesting threats or systematic demands for labour recruitment, monitors should 
record the facts on monitoring forms and alert the ILO monitor, who will report to the ILO Chief 
Technical Adviser. Where it is considered safe to do so and the individual concerned agrees, 
the monitoring unit may raise the matter with local authorities. In all cases, people (including 
children) may be advised to use the hotline access to the national feedback mechanism 
operated by the FTUU and Ministry of Labour 
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3. The ILO’s 2017 Harvest Report: Key Concerns
The ILO’s 2017 Harvest Report: Key Concerns
This section draws on the principles acquired from 
the methodological literature cited in section 2.1, 
and the Monitoring Manual produced by the ILO’s 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work Branch. 
These principles are employed as benchmarks in 
order to evaluate the rigour and ethicality of the 
2017 harvest report produced by the ILO’s third 
party monitoring unit. 
The evaluation is sequenced moving from the particular to the 
general. First, data-collection methods are analysed, with a focus 
on those methods that potentially involve vulnerable participants, 
or indeed those who have been the victim of state-organised 
forced labour. Then consideration is given to data-analysis and 
more general issues relating to research design and independence. 
Throughout this section recommendations are made for remedying 
potential faults and failures in the third party monitoring process, 
that were evidenced in the associated ILO report. 
3.1 Telephone poll 
3.1.1. Methodological concerns
A telephone poll was conducted during the 2017 third 
party monitoring process. According to the 2017 harvest 
report, the poll’s aim was to ascertain awareness and use of 
certain feedback mechanisms being employed to improve 
accountability and reform in the cotton sector. However, for 
reasons that are not stated in the ILO report, a decision was 
made to use poll data in order to estimate country wide incidents 
of forced labour in the cotton sector. Using a random sampling 
method, approximately 800 phone interviews took place. The 
actual sample size is unclear in the report, a matter which is 
explored further below. Notably, this approach departs from the 
method previously used by the ILO’s Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work Branch for measuring incidence of forced labour 
in Uzbekistan. The latter conducted 3500 household surveys, 
using probabilistic sampling. These household surveys involved 
interviews with 10,350 adults aged 18-50 (see ILO 2017a).   
The telephone poll assumes a particular place of importance in 
the 2017 harvest report. It underpins some of the most significant 
factual and analytical claims featured in the headline paragraph 
of the report’s executive summary. In particular, the ILO observe: 
‘The majority of pickers participated in the 2017 harvest on a 
voluntary basis. Data from the telephone poll indicates that 87% 
of cotton pickers did so voluntarily’ (ILO 2018a: 16). 
Given the significant weight placed by the ILO third party 
monitoring unit on telephone poll results throughout the 2017 
harvest report, its methodology requires close scrutiny. A 
review of the ILO report points to a number of irregularities and 
shortcomings in research design and method. 
>> Research aim: On p.16 of the 2017 harvest report 
the telephone poll’s stated aim was ‘to identify the 
perceptions, practices and awareness level of the 
population of Uzbekistan with regards to feedback 
mechanisms on issues related to employment and work 
conditions of the 2017 cotton harvest’ (ILO 2018a: 16). On 
p.65 the aim is restated, but in this instance the aim of the 
poll is broader in character, looking at how the feedback 
mechanisms were used to report on employment and 
work conditions in the cotton sector and beyond: ‘The aim 
of the telephone poll was to identify the awareness level 
and practices of the population of Uzbekistan in referring 
to feedback mechanisms with state authorities and social 
institutions on issues of employment and work conditions, 
including employment and work conditions in cotton 
harvesting in September - October 2017’ (ILO 2018a: 65). 
Notably, in neither statement is the poll’s aim to measure 
incidences of forced labour in the cotton sector at a 
national level. Nevertheless, in the 2017 harvest report the 
data-set produced through the telephone poll was used 
by the ILO to estimate national incidences of forced labour 
in the cotton sector. Clearly serious analytical (and ethical) 
issues arise when data collected for one purpose, is then 
subsequently employed for an end not envisaged in the 
original design process.  
>> Sample size: Numerous inconsistent sample sizes are 
quoted in the ILO third party monitoring report. On p.14 
it is stated that ‘a telephone poll of over 1,000 randomly 
selected citizens of Uzbekistan was carried out’ (ILO 
2018a: 14). Several pages later both ‘over 800’ and ‘829’ 
are quoted (ILO 2018a: 17-18). On p.65 the ILO states: ‘The 
sample size was 800 respondents’ (ILO 2018a: 65). This 
appears to be the planned number, the actual number 
is reported as 829 (ILO 2018a: 65). Yet two waves of 
interviewing totally 1279 participants are noted on p. 71, 
adjusted down to 1129 completed interviews once the 
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exclusion criteria was applied (ILO 2018a: 65 & 71). When 
this sample is then differentiated to show the total per 
call-center operator, the sample size actually adds up to 
1253 interviews (ILO 2018a: 71). Compounding matters it 
is not clear from the report whether a filter question was 
used to ensure interviewees had participated, or had been 
asked to participate in the 2017 cotton harvest. Given that 
the aim of the telephone poll was to measure awareness 
of feedback mechanisms in the cotton sector and beyond, 
it is quite possible a filter question was not used (the 
questionnaire is not publicly available, and the ILO third 
party monitoring unit has not responded to requests for 
a copy of the questionnaire). If we assume this to be the 
case, then based on national labour data we would expect 
that approximately one quarter of the interviewees would 
have participated in the 2017 cotton harvest (ILO 2017a: iii). 
However, this approximation does not take into account 
the gender imbalance in the telephone poll sample. The 
poll sample was made up of 68% males and 32% females 
(ILO 2018a: 67), whereas according to ILO data nearly 
three quarters (71-2%) of cotton pickers were women 
(ILO 2017a: 33). It is possible, therefore, that much less 
than one quarter of the 800 interviewees polled actually 
participated in the cotton harvest, which would raise 
serious concerns over how representative and accurate 
the telephone data is at a national level. 
>> Participation and data-accuracy: The Government of 
Uzbekistan operates a widely feared surveillance apparatus. 
According to Privacy International the security services 
‘systematically eavesdrops on citizens’ communications 
over e-mail, mobile phone and Skype, in online forums, 
and social networks’ (Privacy International 2015; see also 
Bastashevski 2015). The ethical implications associated with 
exposing vulnerable participants to an insecure method 
of communication will be considered in the next section. 
However, from a data-accuracy perspective, the systematic 
surveillance of communications in Uzbekistan seriously 
impacts on mobile telephone user habits. Crucially it 
curtails how willing participants would be to share sensitive 
information over the telephone, especially when it involves 
informing on abuses perpetrated by the government. 
Reluctance to share information would be heightened 
further by an unsolicited telephone call, from an unknown 
party. These methodological issues are not mentioned or 
addressed at all by the third party monitoring team in the 
2017 harvest report.  
>> Interview length: The telephone poll consisted of 25 
questions. The ILO reports that the ‘average length of a 
conversation was 10 minutes’ (ILO 2018a: 71). This would 
appear insufficient in length to properly brief individuals 
on the study and their rights as participants.  If we assume 
that at a minimum three minutes was required in order 
to complete introductions, explain the purposes of the 
poll and inform participants of their rights, each question 
and answer lasted on average, 16.8 seconds. Given the 
rapid speed at which polls were seemingly conducted, it 
is unclear whether questions were delivered at a modest 
pace that would facilitate their full comprehension, with the 
participant given adequate time to seek clarification, reflect 
and thoughtfully offer an answer. The interview length is 
also not indicative of trust or rapport between researcher 
and participant. 
>> Poll Survey Sub-Contractor: The ILO states: ‘The telephone 
poll was conducted by an independent private service 
provider according to international standards’ (ILO 
2018a: 14). No bibliographical reference is made to the 
particular international standard cited here by the ILO 
third party monitoring team. The identity of the private 
service provider is not disclosed in the report either. It is 
impossible, therefore, to verify (a) their standing within 
the research community; (b) their independence, in a 
national commercial environment where private success is 
frequently premised on connections to power-brokers in 
government; or (c) their previous experience of conducting 
research with vulnerable participants, including victims 
of state organised human rights abuses. Therefore, on 
the face of the report it is not clear whether the poll was 
conducted on an independent basis; what international 
benchmarks were used; or, whether the subcontractor had 
experience appropriate to the study being conducted.   
In light of the above weaknesses in research design, sample and 
data-collection method, the credibility of all factual and analytical 
claims made on the basis of the poll must be held in serious 
doubt. Given that the telephone poll was used to underpin some 
of the report’s headline statements, which are now informing 
international policy (United States Department of State 2018), 
these flaws have a heightened importance. 
Breaches: The telephone poll would appear to breach the 
following principles set out in section two: 1.1 (appropriate 
methodology), 1.3 (safe and appropriate space), 3 (credibility), 4 
(transparency), 6 (reliability), 7 (validity).
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Remedy: The ILO third party monitoring team should consider an 
alternative method to phone polls when attempting to estimate 
national incidences of forced labour, such as household surveys. 
Research teams involved in these surveys should be explicitly 
trained in ILO standards for conducting research on forced 
labour. Their independence needs to be clear and protected. 
All surveys should be conducted in a secure and private 
environment, where participants can be confident that their 
right to confidentiality and anonymity is protected. Adequate 
time should be allowed for explaining the study, obtaining 
informed consent and conducting the survey. However, even 
in these circumstances it needs to be recognized that as with 
many crime surveys on sensitive subjects there will be a dark 
figure that exceeds what is recorded in the survey data-set. In 
a political context such as Uzbekistan which has suffered from 
long-term repression, surveillance and denial of basic rights, 
it is extremely difficult for victims of state abuse to disclose 
information, especially to strangers. Therefore, attempts need to 
be made to factor this in, rather than simply ignoring it. Methods 
should be considered that would help build rapport and trust 
with households, drawing on best practice examples globally. 
Triangulation should also be employed to strengthen the validity 
of the data-set. An important focus could here be placed on 
soliciting documentary and oral data using probing investigative 
methods, including where available whistleblower testimony, and 
leaked documents.  
3.1.2 Ethical concerns 
The telephone poll was conducted through a random sample 
of the national population. It can be reasonably anticipated on 
the basis of existing data-sets on gross human rights abuses 
in Uzbekistan that the sample population would contain 
participants who have been victims of forced labour, and other 
forms of traumatic abuse perpetrated by the state. This places 
a series of onerous ethical obligation on the ILO research team. 
They include:
>> Avoid harm: Receiving an unsolicited phone call from an 
individual asking questions relating to abuses perpetrated 
by the government is foreseeably likely to cause distress 
and anxiety for citizens living in a political context such 
as Uzbekistan. This distress and anxiety would be 
heightened if the individual has been the victim of abuse 
in the past. No explicit consideration is given in the 
report methodology to this foreseeable form of harm, nor 
therefore is an explanation given as to what steps were 
taken to avoid and/or manage this type of risk. It is also 
not clear from the report if those participants who solicited 
information suggesting they had been the victim of abuse, 
were provided with information on secure services they 
could access to address their situation.  
>> Informed consent: It is essential that participants, especially 
vulnerable participants who may have been victimized by 
the state, provide informed consent before participating in 
an interview. Participants should be informed of the study 
aims and anticipated outputs. Given the ILO third party 
monitoring unit’s own lack of clarity in the former respect 
(see 3.1.1), it is unclear whether participants were properly 
informed about the aims of the study, or indeed how their 
data would be used. Additionally, participants should be 
informed of their rights, and any potential risks associated 
with involvement in the study. As the ILO unit appears to 
be unaware of the risks they were exposing participants to 
(see below), it is unlikely participants were informed of the 
risks associated with providing data on state abuses over 
an insecure method of communication.  Also, as phone 
interviews lasted on average 10 minutes, which includes 
a 25 question survey, it would appear minimal time was 
allowed to substantively obtain informed consent. Given 
the above concerns there is a high risk that survey data 
acquired through telephone interviews was obtained 
without informed consent. 
>> Confidentiality: Standard mobile telephone 
communications is a notoriously insecure form of 
communication in Uzbekistan. It appears from the report 
methodology that the ILO team did not use end-to-
end encryption services which are provided through 
applications such as Telegram (which is a popular secure 
medium used in Uzbekistan), that could have provided 
some data-protection for participants. In which case 
the ILO has failed to safeguard the confidentiality and 
right to anonymity of participants, and has potentially 
exposed them to retaliation. On the face of the report 
no subsequent steps were taken by the ILO to ensure 
that those who participated in this insecure form of 
communication did not subsequently face repercussions, 
after soliciting sensitive information on state abuses. 
>> Child participants: While the ILO report indicates that some 
interviews were ended after the interviewer discovered 
the participant was under the age of 18, there remains a 
risk that children were included in the sample. Because the 
ILO team elected to use a telephone poll to gauge national 
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incidences of forced labour, it had no way of verifying 
whether the respondent was a child or adult. If a child was 
interviewed, this would ordinarily require a special survey 
with appropriate language, bespoke informed consent 
procedures, and clear disaggregation in the data between 
child and adult respondents.     
>> Trained staff: When conducting interviews with vulnerable 
participants who may be victims of state crime, it is 
essential that those conducting interviews are experienced 
researchers who have specialised training in the area. The 
ILO report states that 12 out of the 14 call-center operators 
involved in conducting telephone interviews were given a 
single day of training (ILO 2018a: Annex 6). The agenda for 
this day of training does not explicitly mention key phrases 
such as vulnerability, informed consent, privacy, harm, or 
confidentiality. It is unclear, therefore, whether such crucial 
topics were covered in the training. Whilst the report 
does state the call-center operators were experienced, 
it does not elaborate on the nature and relevance of that 
experience. For instance, a telemarketing poll is extremely 
different in character to a victim survey; experience in the 
former does not translate into experience in the latter. 
Because the ILO third party monitoring unit does not state 
in its report who the sub-contracting party was – and has 
not responded to queries from the authors – it has been 
impossible to verify their experience in this sensitive area. 
Breaches: The telephone poll would appear to breach the 
following principles set out in section two: 2.1 (informed consent), 
2.2 (anonymity and confidentiality), 2.4 (well-being of participant), 
8 (ethical), 9 (best interest of the child). 
Remedy: The ILO third party monitoring team should consider an 
alternative method to phone polls when attempting to estimate 
national incidences of forced labour, such as household surveys. 
Research teams involved in these surveys should be explicitly 
trained in ILO standards for conducting research on forced 
labour. Their independence needs to be clear and protected. 
All surveys should be conducted in a secure and private 
environment, where participants can be confident that their right 
to confidentiality and anonymity is protected. Adequate time 
should be allowed for explaining the study, obtaining informed 
consent and conducting the survey. However, even in these 
circumstances it needs to be recognized that as with many crime 
surveys on sensitive subjects there will be a dark figure that 
exceeds what is recorded in the survey data-set. In a political 
context such as Uzbekistan which has suffered from long-term 
repression, surveillance and denial of basic rights, it is extremely 
difficult for victims of state abuse to disclose information, 
especially to strangers. Therefore, attempts need to be made 
to factor this in, rather than simply ignoring it. Methods should 
be considered that would help build rapport and trust with 
households, drawing on best practice examples globally. 
3.2.Monitor interviews
On-site monitoring of the cotton harvest was conducted by 
11 ILO experts. The third party monitoring unit states that field 
monitoring focused ‘on assessing how the commitments made 
by the Government of Uzbekistan to eliminate risks of child 
labour and forced labour were implemented, how the systems of 
risk reduction and management operate, and how efficient they 
were in having an impact on vulnerable people’ (ILO 2018a: 14). 
Using eight questionnaires in total it is reported that ‘over 3,000 
interviews were conducted with Khokimiyats, officials of ministries 
and accredited organizations, directors of educational and 
medical facilities, farmers, cotton pickers and brigade leaders, 
public and private sector organizations, professional and non-
professional staff, students and pupils’ (ILO 2018a: 15). This is 
a smaller sample size than 2015 when 9,620 interviews were 
conducted (ILO 2015), but more than 2016 where approximately 
1,700 interviews were conducted (ILO 2017b). The rationale for 
significant variation in sample size is not stated in the report. 
Monitoring teams consisted of 1 x ILO expert, 1 x representative 
of the Federation of Trade Unions of Uzbekistan (a quasi-
government labour entity), 1 x interpreter, and 1 x driver. 
Interviews were conducted by the ILO expert presumably with 
an interpreter where needed, although this is not explicitly 
stated (ILO 2018a: 15). 
3.2.1. Methodological concerns 
Based on the information provided on methodology in the 
2017 harvest report, a number of concerns were identified with 
respect to field monitoring:
>> Sample-size and method: The ILO states that over 3000 
interviews were conducted during the monitoring process 
involving eight distinct stakeholder groups, one of which 
are cotton pickers (ILO 2018a: 14). The report states: ‘…over 
3,000 unaccompanied interviews [were conducted] of cotton 
pickers, farmers, managers/staff of education/health care 
institutions and local authorities on the ground throughout 
Uzbekistan’ (ILO 2018a: 14). However, the ILO press release 
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states that cotton-pickers formed the sole target of the 
3000+ interviews: ‘The report Third-party Monitoring of 
Measures against Child Labour and Forced Labour during 
the 2017 Cotton Harvest in Uzbekistan is based on more than 
3,000 unaccompanied and unannounced interviews with 
a representative sample of the country’s 2.6 million cotton 
pickers’ (ILO 2018b). This would appear overtly misleading. 
No breakdown of the interview sample is provided in 
the report that disaggregates between the eight target 
groups. Nor is information provided on the sample method 
used to ensure it was representative. Nevertheless, the 
ILO unit maintains in its report that the data-set was both 
‘comprehensive and representative’ (ILO 2018a: 14).  
>> Data-collection method: Previously the ILO third party 
monitoring team has employed a separate questionnaire for 
young people under the age of 18 involved in cotton picking 
(ILO 2015). This year a single questionnaire was used for 
cotton pickers. Special procedures should be used with child 
participants to ensure they fully understand the questions 
and nature of the research. The removal of a specially 
designed survey for children, may have impacted on the 
accuracy of the data collected. It is also stated by the ILO 
that ‘questionnaires used for interviews were reviewed and 
streamlined to allow for more efficient interviews and better 
analysis’ (ILO 2018a: 14). No specific information is provided 
on what constitutes a more efficient interview or better 
analysis. The questionnaire for cotton pickers states that the 
interview will be approximately 15 minutes in length. In total 
63 questions are to be asked during this estimated 15 minute 
period. This would entail on average each question and 
answer was given within 14.3 seconds, including translation, 
where needed. It is difficult to imagine that this would allow 
participants adequate time to fully understand questions, and 
then provide a reflective response.    
>> Accuracy of data: It is clear from public speeches, media 
presentations, and policy announcements that the Mirziyoyev 
government wishes to present an image, both domestically 
and internationally, that state organised forced and child 
labour is no longer a reality in Uzbekistan. Soliciting data 
through interviews which contest the accuracy of the 
government’s stated position is a serious matter in a highly 
authoritarian political context such as Uzbekistan, that could 
have repercussions for participants. Indeed, unsanctioned 
criticism of the government can lead to arrest, imprisonment 
and torture (see, for example, Amnesty International 2015; 
Human Rights Watch 2011 & 2014). This is a reality citizens 
are aware of, and forms the formidable backdrop to monitor 
interviews. There is no acknowledgement in the report of 
this challenging political context, or the consequences it may 
have when conducting interviews with vulnerable participants. 
Compounding matters one member of the monitoring team 
present at field sites was a Federation of Trade Unions of 
Uzbekistan (FTUU) representative. The FTUU is a body that 
is widely viewed as a quasi-governmental vehicle whose 
representatives are public officials in everything but name. 
Indeed, Borisov and Clarke (2006) argue that the FTUU has 
‘retained all of the structures and practices of the Soviet 
era intact’, including its ‘complete absorption’ into ‘the state 
apparatus’. With respect to cotton, the FTUU has been directly 
implicated in both pressuring people to participate in the 
harvest, and reprisals directed against whistle-blowers (see 
Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights 2018). While FTUU 
officials did recuse themselves from monitor interviews, 
they were on-site. Participants were then handed a formal 
government document by the ILO expert sanctioning the 
research, another visible reminder of the state’s authority. No 
explicit consideration was given in the report to how these 
political cues may have impacted on vulnerable participants. 
Additionally, no information was provided on where 
interpreters were recruited from, or whether they were state 
employees. Nevertheless, interviews conducted with one or 
two strangers, armed with formal government documentation 
issued by an autocratic regime, who were accompanied to the 
field site by a quasi-government organization, would appear 
a foreboding setting for supplying sensitive data in a political 
context such as Uzbekistan. There is a high risk this impacted 
on the data provided by cotton pickers (see also 3.3).       
>> Training of monitoring team: While it is assumed the 
ILO experts are trained professionals with expertise in 
conducting interviews with vulnerable individuals who may 
be the victim of forced labour, it is unclear from the report 
whether appropriate training was given to other members 
of the monitoring team. In particular, given that interpreters 
were potentially involved in the interviewing process, it 
would be essential for them to be trained in the sensitivities 
associated with this particular type of research.  
>> Data-Analysis: The ILO did not publish the full data-set 
emerging from 2017 field survey. It is impossible, therefore, 
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to fully evaluate data-analysis techniques, or to engage in a 
secondary analysis of the primary data-set. However, some 
general observations are made in section 3.3.
Breaches: Monitoring interviews conducted with cotton pickers 
would appear to breach the following principles set out in 
section two: 1.1 (appropriate methodology), 1.2 (interviewers and 
translators), 1.3 (safe and appropriate space), 1.4 (management of 
data), 3 (credibility), 4 (transparency), 6 (reliability), 7 (validity).
Remedy: Field interviews must be conducted in a private setting. 
No government or quasi-government official should be part of 
the monitoring team. Adequate time must be afforded for the 
interview to ensure each question is understood, and meaningful 
answers can be provided. Where possible independent local 
monitors, with a strong understanding of the local context, 
should be used so interpreters can be dispensed with. Where 
interpreters are needed they should be trained appropriately. 
Clear and explicit consideration should be given to sample 
size, disaggregated by stakeholder group, to ensure they are 
representative. A full and more transparent account should be 
made of sampling method and the data-sets.
3.2.2. Ethical concerns
Based on an evaluation of the 2017 harvest report, the conduct 
of monitoring interviews with cotton pickers raises a number of 
serious ethical concerns:
>> Free participation: It is essential that individuals are not 
coerced into participating in the study. This is a difficult goal 
to achieve in an environment such as Uzbekistan, marked 
as it is by authoritarian rule, strong state surveillance, and 
the denial of basic freedoms. Complicating matters the ILO 
third party monitoring unit has closely associated itself with 
the Government of Uzbekistan, acting as a vocal champion 
of its reform efforts in media and public engagements (see 
3.4). While this is potentially a powerful strategy for achieving 
goals with respect to capacity building and compliance, 
in a context such as Uzbekistan it erodes the ability of the 
ILO to present itself as independent actor, at arms-length 
from government (see further 3.4). Given that the ILO team 
also arrive at the cotton field with a quasi-government 
representative, and provide participants with a formal state 
document sanctioning the study, there is a serious risk 
that cotton pickers will feel compelled to participate in the 
interview believing it is expected by the regime. No explicit 
consideration is given to this risk in the report, nor therefore 
is attention given to steps that might be undertaken by 
monitors to mitigate against this risk.  In the 2015 and 2016 
harvest though concerns were explicitly raised by the ILO 
indicating participants were being coached on how they 
respond to monitoring questions – suggesting some form 
of state coercion was at play. Nevertheless, the ethical 
implications of this were not examined. To the contrary, state 
officials coaching participants on what to say to monitors is 
viewed by the ILO third party monitoring team as a valuable 
learning opportunity, which ‘has the advantage of raising 
awareness of the issue of child and forced labour’ among 
coached participants (ILO 2017a: 8). Furthermore, rather 
than questioning the value of data delivered under such 
conditions the ILO third party monitoring unit states ‘ILO 
experts can simply record what they observe and are told; 
it is not possible for them to verify the information received, 
though triangulation of information has been attempted 
whenever possible’ (ILO 2017a: 8). 
>> Informed Consent: No mention is made in the report, 
or annexures, of cotton pickers being provided with an 
information sheet, or an oral explanation of the monitoring 
process and how their data will be used. The short 
introduction included in the interview questionnaire used 
for cotton pickers is notably vague in this respect. It states: ‘I 
and my staff hold talks and fill out anonymous questionnaires 
in the regions of Uzbekistan with representatives of various 
organizations. These interviews are legal and conducted 
based on agreement between Ministry of Labour, Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry and Federation of Trade Unions 
of Uzbekistan on the one hand and on the other hand - the 
International Labour Organization. Here is the document 
that confirms this (HANDLE [sic] SUPPORT LETTER). 
Anonymous questionnaires are filled with answers from 
thousands of people like you. Therefore, even if you want 
I can not specify your name and surname. And the results 
of the questionnaires will be presented as % of respondent 
answers’ (ILO 2018a: 56). If this is the only information 
supplied to participants, it falls well short of what would be 
required to achieve the ethical principle of informed consent. 
>> Confidentiality and anonymity: Cotton-pickers were 
assured that their data would be collected in an anonymous 
fashion to ensure interview confidentiality. However, the 
questionnaire used for cotton-pickers records the first name 
and telephone number of participants. This personal data 
could reveal the identity of participants if accessed by a third 
party. The implications of this will be discussed further under 
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data-privacy. Additionally, it was stated in the 2017 harvest 
report that: ‘When the ILO TPM team was made aware of 
individual situations [during monitoring] that could have 
consisted of a breach of law or contractual arrangements…
when appropriate, it transmitted these cases to the FTUU 
and Ministry of Employment feedback mechanisms for 
follow-up. The information was shared with the World Bank 
for further dissemination to Project Implementation Units 
and other project stakeholders where such cases related to 
World Bank project sites’ (ILO 2018a: 16). The report does not 
state whether consent was obtained from participants before 
their information was provided to external bodies. There is 
evidence to suggest that those using feedback mechanisms 
have in some instances faced retaliation; there is stronger 
evidence that people fear this to be the case (Uzbek-German 
Forum for Human Rights 2018). No explicit consideration is 
given in the report to any risks participants face when their 
information is passed to external parties, or whether they 
consented to this act, in an environment where many fear 
using the feedback mechanism. 
>> Data privacy: The questionnaires used to conduct interviews 
with cotton pickers, contained potentially sensitive data 
provided by vulnerable participants on matters relating 
to serious rights violations by the state. Additionally, the 
questionnaires collected personal information that could 
reveal the identity of participants. No information was 
provided by the ILO unit on how they secured this personal 
data. Given the extremely serious concerns that have 
been raised over the abuse of surveillance powers by the 
Government of Uzbekistan, data protection would require 
that onerous precautions are taken especially in-country to 
ensure that all hardcopy data was secure, and all digital data 
was encrypted in formats that could withstand government 
hacking capabilities.     
>> Best interest of the child: Research that includes children 
must be conducted in a manner that considers their 
particular vulnerabilities and the methodology and 
instruments should be adapted accordingly.  It is of concern 
that the questionnaire for conducting interviews with cotton 
pickers does not seek to establish the age of the participant 
until the end of the interview, at question 55 and only then 
if the interviewer perceives the age of the participant to be 
‘visually less than 18 years’ (ILO 2018a: 63). The interviewer 
is then instructed to ‘call anyone nearby and ask’ the age of 
the respondent (ILO 2018a: 63).  This would clearly breach 
the participant’s right to confidentiality and anonymity, as 
well as raising concerns over whether a secure and private 
environment is being made available for these sensitive 
interviews. In addition, the ILO third party monitoring unit 
must have a clear ethical protocol for what action is to be 
taken in these circumstances that protects the well-being of 
the child.  The series of options marked in the questionnaire 
do not suggest that there is clear guidance as to what the 
interviewer is to do should it be disclosed that a child is 
working.  
Breaches: Monitoring interviews conducted with cotton pickers 
would appear to breach the following principles set out in section 
two: 2.1 (informed consent), 2.2 (anonymity and confidentiality), 
2.4 (well-being of participants), 2.5 (working with children), 
(2.6 relationship with sponsors, funders, host government), 5 
(neutrality), 8 (ethical), 9 (best interest of the child). 
Remedy: Explicit attention should be paid by the ILO third party 
monitoring team in the planning phase to the question of free 
participation. Extensive consideration should be given to the 
different ways individuals may feel pressured to participate 
in interviews, with appropriate steps taken to remove factors 
that may reduce the ability of participants to freely consent. 
Distancing the monitoring team from governmental agencies, 
and providing potential participants with detailed information on 
the study would contribute towards an environment conducive 
towards informed consent and free participation. This requires 
that appropriate amounts of time are allocated to explaining the 
study, its purposes, and participant rights. Crucially participants 
must be in a position of making an informed decision, where 
it is clear that they will suffer no negative consequences for 
refusing to participate. Participant’s personal data should not 
be collected unless the ILO has in place secure technologies 
through which to store the information, and consent has been 
given by participants. Data given by participants should not 
be used for purposes other than those agreed to, without first 
obtaining explicit consent for this new use. Child participants 
need to be identified at the start of the interview process, not 
at the end. Their right to anonymity and confidentiality should 
not be breached. Special protocols should be in place to ensure 
they are able to freely provide informed consent, and have 
access to a questionnaire that is expressed in terms they can 
readily understand.      
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3.3.Data analysis
Evaluation of the analysis conducted by the ILO third party 
monitoring team was difficult as the data-sets on which the 
report was based have not been published. Even in the 2017 
harvest report, there was limited dissemination of primary data 
obtained from the monitoring questionnaires or telephone poll. 
Ordinarily it would be expected that key questions, anonymized 
responses, and frequencies broken down by demographic 
variation would be presented in a report (see for example ILO 
2017a). These were largely absent. 
However, where some insight into the data yielded from 
questionnaires and surveys was presented, there were instances 
of analysis lacking in critical reflection, or which was in fact 
incongruent with the data that had been presented. In the latter 
respect, for example, the ILO third party monitoring unit reported 
that 37 queries relating to forced labour in the cotton sector had 
been submitted to feedback mechanisms set up by the Ministry 
of Employment and Labour Relations and the FTUU. These 
feedback mechanisms have been established and promoted, 
in part, to provide an effective means of soliciting advice and 
redress to victims of state-organised forced labour. If we take 
these 37 queries as a percentage of the total population which 
the ILO estimates were victims of forced labour in the 2017 
harvest – which for reasons noted above, likely underestimates 
the real total – only 0.011% of those forced to labour reported this 
abuse through the feedback mechanisms. It is unclear whether 
the ILO’s own referrals to the feedback mechanisms during 
third party monitoring were included in the 37 tallied in the 2017 
harvest report. Despite this statistic, the ILO surprisingly finds 
the feedback mechanisms are proving an effective method for 
addressing abuses in the cotton sector, encouraging greater 
investment (ILO 2018a). Yet the data much more strongly points 
to the fact victims are not using the feedback mechanism. This 
finding provides an opportunity for critical reflection and further 
diagnosis. Is it reflective of a lack of trust in government agencies; 
is it connected to fear of reprisals; is it linked to the well know 
surveillance of telephone calls; is it connected to the fact only 
approximately one quarter of the population are aware of the 
feedback mechanism; or is it a combination of these factors, and 
others? Such critical reflection is lacking in the ILO report. 
To use another example, despite the serious limitations 
associated with the telephone poll which would have almost 
certainly led to the underreporting of forced labour, it is still 
estimated that 336,000 people were forced to labour in the 
2017 cotton harvest. This significant figure did not appear in the 
report’s Executive Summary or the associated Press Release. 
The Executive Summary states: ‘The annual cotton harvest in 
Uzbekistan is a unique large-scale effort. In 2017, an estimated 
2.6 million people were recruited to pick cotton during a period 
starting in September and stretching out to early November. 
Most cotton pickers were recruited voluntarily, with the added 
encouragement of raised wages. A certain number pick cotton 
during at least some part of the harvest as a result of persuasion, 
pressure or coercion’ (ILO 2018a: 4).  ‘A certain number’ implies 
dozens or perhaps hundreds, when even by the ILO’s own 
reckoning it was 336,000, which by any standard is a significant 
number of people being forced to labour. 
Examples also exist where there was a clear lack of critical 
reflection. During the 2017 cotton harvest, the ILO reports that 
an order was issued by the Uzbek government to recall ‘a high 
number of students, teachers, nurses and other health workers’ 
who had been forced to labour in the harvest (ILO 2018a: 28). 
The 2017 harvest report observes: ‘…the recall can be seen as 
another major step towards ending forced labour in a critical 
sector of the economy of Uzbekistan’ (ILO 2018a: 29). Despite 
the extensive pre-harvest activities that were undertaken, 
including by the ILO, it is clear a high number of public sector 
employees were still being recruited forcefully. There was an 
absence in the report of any substantive attempt to diagnose the 
organizational causes of this problem, and therefore how these 
causes could be remedied in the future.  
A similar absence of critical reflection could be found with 
respect to the ILO’s methodological findings. For example, 
in its 2016 harvest report, the ILO observed: ‘As in previous 
years, getting beyond what ILO experts were given to hear was 
at times difficult. Many interviewees appeared to have been 
briefed in advance’ (ILO 2017b: 8). This echoed more substantive 
comment made in the 2015 report: 
… getting beyond what monitors were supposed to hear was 
sometimes difficult. Interviewees were circumspect talking to an 
official-looking group of monitors. Some retracted their words 
when justifications were unconvincing. Others were unable or 
unwilling to substantiate their answers. In the ILO’s experience, 
this is unsurprising because in such interviews almost no one 
will directly admit to either being a forced labourer or forcing 
someone else to work. Instead, interviewees were more willing 
to say that they knew of others who were told to pick cotton 
against their will than to say that they were in such a situation 
themselves. (ILO 2015: 6)
20  Measuring Forced Labour in an Authoritarian Context: An Evaluation of ILO Third Party Monitoring in Uzbekistan
Yet the 2017 report, by contrast, notes: ‘Compared to previous 
years all ILO experts reported that people they interviewed 
as a rule appeared confident and willing to openly share their 
thoughts and information with the ILO monitors’ (ILO 2018a: 20). 
There is no subsequent discussion of this extremely surprising 
finding. It would appear reasonable to ask how, in the space 
of a year, does a research context marked by fear, anxiety, 
surveillance, and repression – which is a microcosm of a broader 
political environment shaped by decades of authoritarian rule – 
abruptly undergo a complete transformation, that is counter to 
the broader political environment in which interviews take place. 
The third party monitoring unit’s surprising finding, also contrasts 
with findings produced by other organisations engaged in 
monitoring the 2017 cotton harvest, where notable evidence of 
coaching and threats was indeed uncovered (Uzbek-German 
Forum for Human Rights 2018). The failure to probe this 
extremely surprising shift in the research environment weakens 
the credibility of the findings.  
Breaches: Third party monitoring data-analysis would appear 
to breach the following principles set out in section two: 1.1 
(appropriate methodology), 4 (transparency), 6 (reliability).
Remedy: Anonymised primary data-sets should be published 
in full on the ILO’s website. Detailed analytical breakdowns of 
primary data should be included in the ILO third party monitoring 
report. A peer-review process involving international experts in 
the area of forced labour and human rights should be employed 
to strengthen data-analysis and critical reflection. Peer-reviewers 
should be secured through an open call, using a transparent 
appointment process. 
3.4.Independence and objectivity
If the third party monitoring of forced and child labour in 
Uzbekistan’s cotton sector is to yield credible findings it is 
essential that the responsible ILO unit operate at an arms-
length from the Government of Uzbekistan. This is necessary 
for safeguarding their independence and neutrality. All of which 
are fundamental ramparts for building relations of trust and 
confidentiality with victims, vulnerable participants, and the 
wider national population, from whom meaningful data can be 
obtained. It is also an essential foundation for producing rigorous 
results which has credibility in the eyes of key stakeholder 
groups. However, it is a complicated task. On the one hand, the 
Government of Uzbekistan is the perpetrator of the human rights 
abuses witnessed in the cotton sector, yet at the same time it is 
a partner in the third party monitoring process, which formally 
sanctions the ILO’s work. This in itself creates a difficult situation 
that raises questions over the ILO’s ability to act independently 
when conducting third party monitoring.  
The ILO’s capacity to act in an independent and arms-length 
manner is further reduced by the third party monitoring design, 
which generates multiple conflicts of interest. Under third party 
monitoring the ILO has agreed to help build the government’s 
capacity to eradicate child and forced labour in the cotton sector. 
The ILO is also charged with independently evaluating how 
effective these governmental measures have been at reducing 
and ending forced labour. 
This creates at least two potential conflicts of interest. 
First, the ILO is in effect responsible for evaluating, in part, how 
successful its own capacity building and training efforts have 
been. This is brought home most visibly on p.10 and p.14 of the 
2017 harvest report, where the same organisations that feature 
in ILO trainings delivered by the third party monitoring team 
to strengthen capacity, are then interviewed by a supposedly 
independent ILO third party monitoring team to gauge whether 
this training, among other factors, is yielding results. 
Secondly, any findings yielded from monitoring data that suggest 
the Government of Uzbekistan is failing in its commitment to 
end forced and child labour, if reported in a robust manner, 
could fatally undermine the ILO’s ability to build capacity within 
government in the future. Capacity building relies on the strong 
levels of trust and rapport built up by the ILO team. Embarrassing 
the Government of Uzbekistan with unfavourable findings would 
undermine this relationship. 
These conflicts of interest need to be explicitly acknowledged 
by the ILO team, and a convincing argument made for how they 
can be handled without undermining the credibility and validity 
of third party monitoring data-sets and analysis.
It is also important that steps are taken that clearly protect the 
ILO third party monitoring team’s independence. A crucial pillar 
of independence is the ability to operate at arms-length from 
parties whose conduct is being monitored. This is especially 
the case in a political context such as Uzbekistan. Decades of 
authoritarian rule, marked by surveillance, repression, and the 
denial of political opposition, has created a social environment 
where citizens as a matter of self-preservation must be careful 
of what they say, who they say it to, and the medium used to 
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transmit information. This is reflective of a broader environment 
of suspicion that comes with the systemic abuses of power that 
have marked the Uzbek state since independence. 
Against this backdrop, it is crucial for the legitimacy of third party 
monitoring results, that the ILO team demonstrate actively that they:
1. are independent from the Government of Uzbekistan; 
2. are an objective party who enter the field with no 
preconceptions; and 
3. can be trusted to securely receive and store sensitive data 
provided by vulnerable participants, at risk of retribution. 
The ILO’s capacity to achieve this in Uzbekistan has been 
undermined in part by the third party monitoring design, pointed 
to above. However, this has been exacerbated further by the ILO 
third party monitoring unit’s leadership. Through social media 
accounts, mass media appearances, and public presentations, 
the ILO third party monitoring unit has vocally championed 
the Mirziyoyev government and its efforts to eradicate forced 
labour in the cotton sector, before systematic results are to 
hand confirming commitments have translated into tangible, 
sustainable and pervasive results. It appears on the face of 
these public statements that the third party monitoring team 
has placed a strategic premium on encouraging/applauding the 
government, and cementing its working relationship with public 
officials, over and above ensuring the third party monitoring unit 
is seen as an independent body, operating at arms-length from 
the authoritarian regime, with an uncompromising commitment 
to transparently reporting on the forced labour situation in 
Uzbekistan, without fear or favour. 
This approach adopted by the third party monitoring unit is 
exemplified most acutely by the unit’s lead, who uses twitter to (i) 
applaud the Mirziyoyev government’s role in eradicating forced 
and child labour; (ii) champion broader government reforms; 
(iii) promote the business environment cultivated by the Uzbek 
state; (iv) share data that selectively focuses attention on those 
who voluntarily participate in the cotton harvest; (v) retweet 
media articles and reports favorable to the Uzbek government; 
(vi) challenge those placing a spotlight on the forced labour 
problem in Uzbekistan; (vii) challenge those raising concerns 
over the harassment of independent cotton harvest monitors; 
and (viii) challenge those drawing attention to the deleterious 
human rights record of the Uzbek state (see @AstrupILO). 
Compounding matters, the ILO’s capacity building activities with 
government, which takes place before, and during, the cotton 
harvest monitoring, are publicly promoted through PR images 
and videos that feature ILO and state officials in close and 
friendly encounters. Subsequently when ILO experts arrive in 
the cotton field, the team includes a quasi-government official. 
Cotton pickers are then provided with state documentation 
sanctioning the research. 
In this context, the line between government and the ILO 
third party monitoring unit becomes difficult to distinguish. 
This increases the likelihood that cotton pickers, and other 
stakeholders, will (a) feel compelled to participate in the third 
party monitoring research, whether they wish to or not; and (b) 
will submit information that tallies with formal government policy, 
which may not be the same as substantive reality. The third party 
monitoring unit’s public stance also places a question mark over 
their ability to independently and critically interpret monitoring 
data. Combined, these issues serve to reduce the credibility of 
ILO third party monitoring findings. 
Breaches: The design and implementation of third party 
monitoring would appear to breach the following principles set 
out in section two: 1.2 (interviewers and translators), 1.3 (safe and 
appropriate space), 2.6 (relationship with sponsors, funders, host 
government), 3 (credibility), 5 (neutrality), 6 (reliability).
Remedy: A clear organizational distinction needs to be made 
between the entity responsible for training, capacity building, 
and awareness, and the entity responsible for measuring the 
Uzbek state’s progress in eradicating forced and child labour. 
The teams and entities responsible for either activity should be 
visibly and practically distinct. The entity and team responsible 
for measuring progress in eradicating forced and child labour 
should be arms-length from government at all stages. The team 
should conduct themselves in public and private in a manner 
that would strengthen public confidence in their objectivity and 
independence. They should be at liberty to report their findings 
independently and robustly.   
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4. Conclusion and Recommendations
Conclusion and Recommendations
The struggle to end forced and child labour in 
Uzbekistan has made remarkable progress over 
the last decade. Credit for this in large part goes to 
the bravery and determination of victims, activists, 
independent monitors, journalists, advocates, and 
whistle-blowers, who at great personal risk, have 
cast a global spotlight on this serious form of state 
criminality. Their efforts have prompted a welcomed 
change in government policy and practice in 
Uzbekistan. The ILO third party monitoring unit 
has entered this process as an organizational 
entity which can potentially help amplify and 
safeguard the progress made to date. There is 
evidence to suggest that the ILO has successfully 
built a relationship of trust and rapport with the 
Government of Uzbekistan, which has created 
the space to engage in meaningful dialogue and 
capacity building. This will likely help buttress the 
progress witnessed over the past three years. 
However, if the movement towards ending forced and child labour 
is to be effectively prosecuted it needs accurate diagnostic tools 
that can identify enduring problems stymieing the reform process, 
and longitudinal data-sets that can accurately measure in a fine-
tuned manner the pace and trajectories of change. The serious 
weaknesses documented in section three indicate that third party 
monitoring in its current design and form is not providing the 
diagnostic tools and data-sets required to effectively guide the 
reform process in Uzbekistan. 
It is also important that the third party monitoring unit does not 
adopt a consequentialist logic, where the “ends” justify the 
“means”. Those who agree to provide their data to the third 
party monitoring team, are not tools for helping to advance the 
goal of ending forced labour. They are human beings with rights, 
dignity, and agency. Given the significant risks faced by citizens 
in Uzbekistan who openly contest government policy,  
an especially robust ethical protocol is needed in order to 
secure, free participation, informed consent, confidentiality, 
anonymity, and avoiding harm to participants or monitors. An 
evaluation of the 2017 harvest report suggests there have been 
critical failures in this respect.
Set out below are a series of recommendations designed to 
help remedy the shortcomings and failures observed in the 
2017 harvest report. However, given the seriousness of the 
problems identified, the ILO should also consider establishing 
its own independent evaluation of the third party monitoring 
unit in Uzbekistan, drawing on local and international expertise 
in the area of forced labour, human rights, and cognate fields. 
This review would likely need to be married to a root and 
branch redesign of third party monitoring, drawing again on 
local knowledge and international expertise, that can ensure 
future iterations of third party monitoring meet the ILO’s own 
standards set out in section 2, and the standards elucidated in 
the methodological literature. 
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Area Recommendations
Telephone Poll 1.    The ILO third party monitoring team should consider an alternative method to phone polls 
when attempting to estimate national incidences of forced labour, such as household surveys. 
Research teams involved in these surveys should be explicitly trained in ILO standards for 
conducting research on forced labour. Their independence needs to be clear and protected.  
All surveys should be conducted in a secure and private environment, where participants can 
be confident that their right to confidentiality and anonymity is protected. Adequate time should 
be allowed for explaining the study, obtaining informed consent and conducting the survey. 
However, even in these circumstances it needs to be recognized that as with many crime 
surveys on sensitive subjects there will be a dark figure that exceeds what is recorded in the 
survey data-set. In a political context such as Uzbekistan which has suffered from long-term 
repression, surveillance and denial of basic rights, it is extremely difficult for victims of state 
abuse to disclose information, especially to strangers. Therefore, attempts need to be made  
to factor this in, rather than simply ignoring it. Methods should be considered that would 
help build rapport and trust with households, drawing on best practice examples globally. 
Triangulation should also be employed to strengthen the validity of the data-set. An important 
focus could here be placed on soliciting documentary and oral data using probing investigative 
methods, including where available whistleblower testimony, and leaked documents.  
Field Interviews 2.   Field interviews must be conducted in a private setting. No government or quasi-government 
official should be part of the monitoring team. Adequate time must be afforded for the 
interview to ensure each question is understood, and meaningful answers can be provided. 
Where possible independent local monitors, with a strong understanding of the local context, 
should be used so interpreters can be dispensed with. Where interpreters are needed they 
should be trained appropriately. Clear and explicit consideration should be given to sample 
size, disaggregated by stakeholder group, to ensure they are representative. A full and more 
transparent account should be made of sampling method and the data-sets.
3.   Explicit attention should be paid by the ILO third party monitoring team in the planning phase 
to the question of free participation. Extensive consideration should be given to the different 
ways individuals may feel pressured to participate in interviews, with appropriate steps taken 
to remove factors that may reduce the ability of participants to freely consent. Distancing the 
monitoring team from governmental agencies, and providing potential participants with detailed 
information on the study would contribute towards an environment conducive towards informed 
consent and free participation. This requires that appropriate amounts of time are allocated 
to explaining the study, its purposes, and participant rights. Crucially participants must be in 
a position of making an informed decision, where it is clear that they will suffer no negative 
consequences for refusing to participate. Participant’s personal data should not be collected 
unless the ILO has in place secure technologies through which to store the information, and 
consent has been given by participants. Data given by participants should not be used for 
purposes other than those agreed to, without first obtaining explicit consent for this new use. 
Child participants need to be identified at the start of the interview process, not at the end. 
Their right to anonymity and confidentiality should not be breached. Special protocols should 
be in place to ensure they are able to freely provide informed consent, and have access to a 
questionnaire that is expressed in terms they can readily understand.     
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Area Recommendations
Data-Analysis 4.   Anonymised primary data-sets should be published in full on the ILO’s website. Detailed 
analytical breakdowns of primary data should be included in the ILO third party monitoring 
report. A peer-review process involving international experts in the area of forced labour and 
human rights should be employed to strengthen data-analysis and critical reflection. Peer-
reviewers should be secured through an open call, using a transparent appointment process.  
Independence and Objectivity 5.   A clear organizational distinction needs to be made between the entity responsible for training, 
capacity building, and awareness, and the entity responsible for measuring the Uzbek state’s 
progress in eradicating forced and child labour. The teams and entities responsible for either 
activity should be visibly and practically distinct. The entity and team responsible for measuring 
progress in eradicating forced and child labour should be arms-length from government at 
all stages. The team should conduct themselves in public and private in a manner that would 
strengthen public confidence in their objectivity and independence. They should be at liberty to 
report their findings independently and robustly.  
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